Lecture by Markus Brill (Technische Universität Berlin): Approval-Based Apportionment
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters cast approval ballots over parties, such that each voter can support multiple parties. This approval-based apportionment setting generalizes traditional apportionment and is a natural restriction of approval-based multiwinner elections, where approval ballots range over individual candidates. Using techniques from both apportionment and multiwinner elections, we identify rules that generalize the D'Hondt apportionment method and that satisfy strong axioms which are generalizations of properties commonly studied in the apportionment literature. In fact, the rules we discuss provide representation guarantees that are currently out of reach in the general setting of multiwinner elections: First, we demonstrate that extended justified representation is compatible with committee monotonicity (also known as house monotonicity). Second, we show that core-stable committees are guaranteed to exist and can be found in polynomial time.
Joint work with Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, and Kai Wilker.
Time & Location
Nov 22, 2021 | 02:15 PM
Technische Universität Berlin
Institut für Mathematik
Straße des 17. Juni 136
Room MA 041 (Ground Floor)